The Jordanian Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001 and the Emirati Commercial Agency Law No. 2 of 2010 cover all forms of sale contracts through intermediaries. These Laws provide express restrictions and protective provisions on the conduct by local agents of internal commercial agency activities. However, these statutory protections are granted only to registered agencies conducted by national agents.
far outpacing economies as a whole.
1 Agents play essential role in promoting the sale of their principal's products and performing a multiplicity of other functions for their principals, ranging from the procurement of visas and customs clearances to providing support and assistance in contract negotiations and local government relations.
The law of commercial agency in Jordan is statutory. Agency is subject to dual regulation; civil and commercial codes. . 2 The Arab legal system distinguishes between acts to which private persons are parties (civil acts) and acts to which merchants are parties (commercial acts). The former are generally subject to the civil code and the latter to the commercial code. The civil and commercial codes complement each other in many areas including agency relations. See H S Shaaban, Commercial Transactions in the Middle East: What Law Governs? 31 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 157, 160-163 (1999) . See also See Mohamed El-Sayed El-Keky, Commercial Law 78 (in Arabic) (2004) . 3 See Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001, Official Gazette No. 4496 (July 16, 2001 ).
The purpose of this article is to study certain aspects-exclusivity and termination-of commercial agency according to the Jordanian law. 4 The article is divided into four sections. Section two explains the general rules governing commercial agency in Jordan.
Section three analyzes exclusivity of commercial agents. This section introduces the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the basic instrument covering trade in services, and analyses the current commercial agencies regulation in Jordan and its relation to articles VIII and IX of GATS. Also, section two explores Jordan schedule of specific commitments under the GATS in order to shed light on the extent and limit of its obligations with regard to commercial agents. Section four discusses agency termination. Finally, the article concludes by summarizing the main issues discussed and provides recommendations to streamline agency law in Jordan.
II. What is an Agency?
The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries No. 28 of 2001 defines a commercial agent broadly so that it covers commission agent, agent who distributes on his own behalf (distributor), and agent who distributes on behalf of a foreign company or a trader whose headquarter is located outside Jordan (commercial agent). 5 Moreover, the Commercial Code defines commercial agency as an agency related to commercial acts 4 The article examines mainly the agency laws of Jordan. Reference to laws of other Arab countries will be made when necessary. The agency laws in the countries discussed share similar characteristics. For example, in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where private enterprise is encouraged, foreign suppliers must use agents in practically all instances. In general, these countries reserve agency activities to their own nationals. Agents are regulated by mandatory registration procedures, and they are protected against arbitrary termination by their foreign principals. See Sections II and IV infra. 5 A commercial middleman is defined as any person who carries on the profession of mediation with a view to concluding or facilitating the inclusion of commercial dealings and transactions, in return for a fee provided that such a person is not an employee or a deputy of either one of the two parties to such commercial transactions. involving an agent who carries out his duties in the name of his principal. 6 The concepts of commercial agency and other intermediaries such as distributorship are not clearly distinguished in the Jordanian laws. 7 As a result, regulators and practitioners alike may suffer from uncertainty about the exact kinds of commercial arrangements intended to be regulated as agencies.
The Jordanian law should define a commercial agency, in a straightforward manner, as an independent individual or juristic person who is contractually controlled by a principal and assigned to promote, sell, distribute products and provide services in the name and on behalf of the principal for remuneration. 8 The distributor is an independent contractor who buys and resells for his own account and is normally free to fix his own resale prices. 9 The distributor must generally pay the manufacturer regardless of whether or not he has been paid by his own customers. The distributor thus acts on his own behalf and assumes the risk of possible insolvency of the customers, which is not the case for the agent. 10 In contrast with a distributor, a commercial agent does not own the goods and thus must render the proceeds of his sales to the principal.
6 Acts defined as commercial in the commercial include purchase of goods intended to be sold as they are or after their manufacture, leasing of goods for lease, exchange operations, banking operations, land and maritime and air transport, brokerage and commission, insurance, public entertainment, and business agencies. Other commercial acts which are similar to these acts by nature or aim are considered commercial acts. J. 187, 215 (2008) . 8 A person is independent if he is essentially free to arrange his activity and determine his hours of work. It is important to point out the distinction between an independent agent and an employee. Any person who is regularly entrusted to solicit business for an entrepreneur or conclude business in his name is deemed an employee. Whether someone is independent turns on the factual circumstances of each case; merely having an agreement declare independence or non-employee status may not suffice. 9 In the agency situation, the manufacturer retains an absolute control of the price at which his products will be sold in Jordan. 10 In practice, however, the contrast between an agent and a distributor is often not so marked. This is the case, for example, where the manufacturer participates in or follows closely the activities of the distributor, or where, for a variety of reasons, the distributor's gross profit upon his resale of the goods is not more than and brokers. The reasonable justification for the rule of direct relationship is to maintain the requirement of nationality and make commercial agency a closed circuit.
The importation of most products is allowed by both private and public entities.
Jordan only restricts the use of agents in armaments contracts. The law prohibits anyone acting as an agent from buying, importing, or selling arms, spare parts and ammunition. 63-68 (1990) .
The importation of armament and defense equipments must be channeled through government departments.
The The primary duty for an agent is to carry out the authority granted to him by the principal. 26 In carrying out his authority, the agent must act with the care of an ordinary person. 27 An agent receives the funds of his principal as a trustee. 28 As such, the agent the liable if the funds are lost due to his negligence. The products must be sold at a price fixed by the principal. 29 Hence, an agent is not free to sell the products at a lower price or any other price. The agent, as part of the agency contract, must report to the principal the agency's activities and other information regarding its performance. 30 The purpose of this reporting is to keep the principal abreast of the affairs of the agency and to act As a commercial agent has certain duties, the principal is also bound by certain duties. For example, the principal is under an obligation to remunerate the agent.
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The Jordanian law does not specify any remuneration ceilings. The agent's remuneration could be based on a percentage of the value of the contract obtained through the agent.
Moreover, the law does not specify if the commercial agent has a right to remuneration for the business concluded which is to be attributed to his activity. In some cases, an agent may have the right to remuneration without having conducted any attributable activity. If, for instance, an agent is assigned an exclusive sales area or a defined group of customers, he has the right to claim remuneration for all contracts concluded with persons within the scope of the area or with the designated customers, even though he did not actually participate in the transaction. The law does not determine when the remuneration is due. It could be due upon the completion of the supplier's performance of the transaction. Unless otherwise provided by contract, the principal could account for remunerations on a monthly basis.
The principal is bound by the agent's actions. 32 However, the agent is jointly and severally liable with the principal to the local merchant for whose benefit a contract has been concluded until all the terms and conditions of the contract have been performed. words, exclusivity is determined by general principals of contract and is a matter of negotiation between a foreign principal and its Jordanian commercial agent. In practice, all commercial agents are Jordanian nationals and enjoy exclusive privileges.
The first inquiry into exclusivity involves the express language of the agency agreement between the parties. Agency can be de facto exclusive without an express agreement between manufacturer and agent.
A manufacturer can simply appoint an agent in a particular geographic area and refrain from appointing any other. To put it differently, a manufacturer may impose territorial limitations upon the agent which confine an agent's sales within an assigned geographic area. For example, a cheese manufacturer might expressly prohibit each agent from selling cheese outside its assigned territory. This type of restriction can be referred to as an "exclusive territory" as it results in a closed territory. 43 A manufacturer can agree that the agent will sell the manufacturer's product only within a specified territory. This arrangement, which can be referred to as creating an "exclusive sales territory," limits the agent's freedom to deal with other manufacturers. In other words, the agent is not free to sell the goods of other manufacturers in the designated areas. A manufacturer may also forbid its agents to sell to certain designated customers or customer classes. 44 assign a class of customers to some, but not all, agents so as to permit agent specialization.
The question is whether the manufacturer, having granted the agent territorial exclusivity, thereafter lawfully may engage in market expansion conduct designed to increase the manufacturer's market penetration within the territory already provided to the manufacturer's agent. Agents fearing encroachment of their established and welldeveloped territories could respond by filing lawsuits against the manufacturer. The encroachment of the manufacturer violates his contractual obligations to the dealer.
A. The Law and Economics of Competitive Market
Competition is the linchpin of the free market system. A market is considered distributor can count on from the other, and the prices at which distributors sell. The negative anti-competitive effects of exclusivity can be considerable.
Exclusivity of commercial agency can be a restraint of trade or monopolization.
47
Exclusivity can raise barriers to entry or market access and thus enhance unilateral priceraising power. The loss of business resulting from exclusivity could lead to claims of anti-monopoly violations by excluded parties. 48 An exclusive agency can eliminate rivalry among agents in the sale of the manufacturer's product and has the potential of permitting the authorized agent himself to exercise some market power. 49 However, the manufacturer's or agent's purpose could be not to limit rivalry in itself or to permit an agent to exercise market power but rather to render more efficient the distribution of his product. The manufacturer would not grant the exclusive agency unless he believed it would make the distribution of his product more efficient. Exclusivity can be lawful in the absence of monopolistic purpose or anticompetitive effect i.e. the maintenance of a minimum pricing. That exclusive agency is lawful remains to be tested in courts. By bringing the case, discussed above, the agent sought to protect regular trade channels. Local agents have built the goodwill of imported products by marketing plan, promotional efforts, and providing a product warranty through after-sale servicing. The purpose of all these programs is to maintain clients and increase the sale of goods. Agents provide services and incur costs that parallel importers may not provide or incur. Thus, parallel importers free ride at the expense of authorized distributors. In addition, parallel 51 Parallel imports or gray market goods are genuine goods and not counterfeits whereby trademark is misappropriated. See Keith E. Maskus, Parallel Import, 23 World Econ. 1269 (2000 . 52 See Court of Cassation, Journal of Jordanian Bar Association, Case No. 95/1418 , page 957 (1996 .
imports may damage product quality control. Poor quality could cause consumer confusion and diminish the reputation of the manufacturer and agent.
B. The General Agreement on Trade in Services
The basic WTO instrument regulating trade in services is GATS, introduced as Article VI of the GATS deals with domestic regulation. At its most basic level, it provides that in sectors where specific commitments are undertaken, each Member shall ensure that all measures of general application affecting trade in services are administered in a reasonable, objective, and impartial manner. GATS sets out specific rules to apply to measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards, and licensing requirements to ensure that they do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services. 60 Such measures in domestic regulations should not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services.
Beyond this, the negotiating technique adopted in drawing up the GATS is unique.
Unlike the GATT, which involves a negative list approach under which any item or sector not included in a schedule is deemed to be automatically covered by the agreement, the GATS involves a positive list approach, under which only those items specifically scheduled by a contracting party are covered. The latter approach is inherently more restrictive, since only those commitments and sectors which the parties have expressly considered are covered. This approach excludes, for example, newlyemerged services that parties could not anticipate at the time of negotiations.
C. Jordan's Specific Commitments in Relation to Commercial Agency
Jordan made specific commitments in specific service sectors on both market access-Article XVI of GATS-and national treatment-Article XVII of GATS. 61 These specific commitments are inscribed in a schedule with such limitations and derogations as 60 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, supra note 53, at art. VI.4. 61 In addition to specific commitments, Jordan adopted a general commitment that may not be undermined or modified by it to recognize most-favored nation status (MFN status). The general commitment applies horizontally to all sectors and to all countries. Id. art. II.1 (With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement [GATS] , each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country).
Jordan deemed necessary. These specific commitments effectively form the crux of the obligations currently undertaken by Jordan under the GATS, since they determine the incidence of the wider, more general disciplines under the agreement.
The sector of distribution services-whereby Jordan made many commitmentsincludes postal, energy, land transportation, maritime, environmental, audiovisual, and tourism services. However, since my goal is not to analyze this sector thoroughly in the present article, at this stage I will discuss Jordan's commitments as they relate to commercial agency only.
With regard to commercial agency, Jordan submitted a rather limited schedule of commitments. Jordan introduced several limitations on market access. Barriers to market access include exclusive rights for "Jordanians" to supply; restrictions on the legal entity through which a service supplier may deliver the service (e.g., natural persons and partnerships); and limitations on the level of shareholding or equity that a foreign service supplier may make. 62 Jordan also made no commitments for "presence of natural persons" mode of supply so that it could introduce or maintain measures inconsistent with market access or national treatment.
The commitments made by Jordan with regard to commercial agency can be evaluated as trade barriers operated intentionally to protect the exclusivity rights for Jordanian agents. However, these commitments may reflect the particular cultural-social environment in Jordan which would support their incorporation, the necessity of sustaining specific public policy objectives, or the inevitable reflection of the particular situation intrinsic to Jordan. WTO, commercial agency seems to be particularly ripe for the consideration of competition policy and for further liberalization.
IV. Termination of Commercial Agency
Agent effectiveness within his assigned market area is critical to a manufacturer's plans. Ineffective agents can lead to lost sales and ultimately taking the manufacturer out of the market. As such, the principal or manufacturer can terminate the existing agency relationship. The termination clause is one of the most important clauses in any agency agreement. The elements of the clause involve: mutual termination rights without cause; a definite term; termination for cause; and the delineation of the parties' rights and obligations upon termination and thereafter.
The simplest form of termination is bilateral termination right whereby the agency agreement is terminable by both parties. 63 Thus, one party cannot terminate a valid agency contract without the agreement of other party. While unilateral termination is generally accepted for ordinary contracts, 64 the Law of Commercial Agents and agent allows him to claim compensation. 67 The rule seems to apply only to termination of an agency before its expiry term. Thus, termination of an agency agreement due to its expiration does not entitle the agent to compensation. In commercial agency for fixed term, the agreement, not the law, may provide for serving a notice. It is possible that an agency agreement does not contain a provision for termination. In this scenario, the length of the contract will be set at a reasonable duration.
An agent may sue the principal/manufacturer for termination without cause or fault on the part of the agent and may recover any damages relating to the termination and his lost profits. 68 Causes for termination may include fraud or breach of contract. These causes are considered significant transgressions committed by the agent that merit termination. The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries of 2001 does not provide standards for "cause or fault." 69 The presence of these standards is designed to prevent principals or manufacturers from engaging in opportunistic behavior when the relationship between the principal and the agent sour. In addition, these standards compel principals to treat their agent fairly. The law should have provided that termination can only occur upon a failure to perform substantially on material aspects of the contract. The law also should have provided an opportunity for the agent to correct the problem before resorting termination. In other words, termination of an agency agreement should be the last resort. The law does not address the issue of burden of proof of cause for termination and whether the burden falls upon the principal or the agent.
To protect the principal against an agent's under-performance, the agency agreement ought to include a performance evaluation provision which should be linked to a termination. Such an evaluation provision may include sales performance trends over time. 70 In this way, a manufacturer can reasonably justify the termination of the agency within for those commercial agents who fail to perform effectively.
In the event of wrongful termination, the Jordanian courts decide the amount of indemnity owed to the agent, taking into account the harm actually suffered by the agent and lost profits. 71 In practice, however, the indemnity is frequently determined arbitrarily by the courts on the basis of an annual commission arrived at by averaging the commissions of the preceding years of activity. 72 A court is likely to take into account as well factors other than the amount of past commissions, such as showroom costs, warehouse, maintenance or repair facility, the amount of money which the agent has invested, the portion of the agent's time which has been devoted to the principal's business, or the cost to the agent of the termination of employment and other contracts resulting from the termination of the sales agency relationship. To recover this indemnity, the agent must demonstrate that he has not breached the agency agreement, and that he 70 Jordanian courts must walk a fine line in interpreting the evaluation provision. For example, the fact that sales for a given year are less than those of the previous year "without being ridiculously low" is not sufficient to deprive the agent of a termination indemnity. Also, in a case where mandatory sales goals are provided, courts should refuse to permit termination of an agency agreement for failure to comply with the sales goals, on the ground that such failure do not result from a lack of activity on the part of the agent but from the fact the products are becoming less popular with the potential customers. Rather, the Jordanian legislator left the exclusivity provision to the agreement of the parties. Rational use of exclusive agency may affect competition and consumer welfare.
Anti-monopoly enforcement agencies should not elevate the short-term pecuniary interests of discrete competitors at the expense of competition and consumer welfare.
That exclusive agency is lawful remains to be tested in courts. If a case arises in the future, courts should uphold exclusive agency. When the decision to grant an exclusive agency is made by manufacturer acting in its own self interest, consumer welfare could be protected to a greater extent than any ad hoc decision-making by a court could secure.
A subsidiary rationale for sanctioning exclusive agency is the common sense notion that courts should not provide artificial, non-market incentives for internal expansion, an alternative to exclusive agency that will be inefficiently pursued if appointments of exclusive agents are met with expense and protracted challenges under the anti-monopoly laws.
Jordanian courts have exclusive jurisdiction in settling disputes arising out of commercial agency contracts. The Law of Commercial Agents and Intermediaries does not permit the use of other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration and mediation. Litigation flies in the face of maintaining healthy relations between the principal and agent. The principal and agent must continuously cultivate good personal relationships. These types of mechanisms help mitigate the spillover effects of disputes between principals and agents especially if they are engaged in long-term relationships.
Therefore, the law should be amended so as to permit the use of such mechanisms.
On balance, Jordan's approach to the use of commercial agents is restrictive. The law sets certain conditions for a person to act as an agent. For instance, these conditions relate to nationality and registrations. Only Jordanian persons can become agents for foreign principals or manufacturers. In addition to the nationality condition, a commercial agent must be duly registered at the Commercial Agents Registry of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The purpose of registration, among other things, is to keep record of persons acting as agents. As currently written, the law does not invalidate an unregistered commercial agent who can practice agency. The law should be modified to invalidate unregistered commercial agents so as to protect consumers and other third parties whom may deal with the agent.
In discussing exclusivity of commercial agency, Law of Commercial Agents and WTO rules are closely related and interact with each other. It is not surprising, therefore, that the GATS, through articles VIII and IX, places an obligation on the part of WTO members not to introduce more restrictive rules on the flow of services and preserve the degree of access provided under current domestic regulations. Jordan maintains restrictions in the distribution sector, including commercial agency, in which foreign investment is circumscribed through equity and other restrictions. Trade partners may pressure the Jordanian government to adopt the policy of increasing competition in commercial agency as a basic principle of regulatory reform. Moreover, GATS can be a promising tool for achieving liberalization in commercial agency sector. Thus, any future modification to the commercial agency law will not be a voluntary response by the government to internal public and private sector concerns who prefer to maintain the status quo.
The termination clause is one of the most important clauses in any agency agreement. The agency agreement can terminate by the mutual desire of parties, at a definite time, or for a good cause. A manufacturer cannot terminate the agency at any time, for any reason or for no reason at all. An agent may sue the manufacturer for termination without cause or fault on the part of the agent and may recover any damages relating to the termination and his lost profits. The "cause" standard for termination is vague and variable because clear patterns of acceptable or proscribed conduct are difficult to discern. The law, or even courts through judicial decisions, should provide a bright-line standard for termination. It is also advisable that a reason be given for the termination so as to avoid a claim that the termination is malicious. In addition, a notice of termination, with a "cure" provision should be included in the law. In other words, the law should provide a notice of termination so that the agent and principal can settle their accounts and avoid surprise termination. Even before termination, the law could grant the agent a grace period to rectify the problem that would merit termination.
Many lawsuits are the product of the parties' failure to honestly or sufficiently communicate their expectations of each other during the course of their agency relationship. As far as the contract is concerned, the structure of a commercial agency agreement varies considerably, depending on the legal drafting technique. A well-written contract, combined both with honest communication by the manufacturer and solid justifications for its business conduct, are big steps toward avoiding the filing of a lawsuit to begin with. Beneficial relationships will result from a combination of frequent and timely communications between the principal and his agent and also from knowledge of the laws of Jordan related to commercial agency. If still more reforms do prove necessary, the presently suggested improvements will give future legislatures the background for serious consideration and understanding of what, in fact, remains to be done.
